

# Practical Security

System and Network Administration

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# Security Basics

*assuming a server or network device – not a desktop*

*What are the most important things to do in terms of security?...*

==> System & network security in a nutshell

- ▶ shutdown unused services + 14 firewall + 13/acl
- ▶ system updates
- ▶ no passwords (or at least no weak passwords)

*How to check what's listening locally again?...*

==> that should be clear by now

```
netstat -lntup
```

Also check remotely for clarity and in case a rootkit is hiding some listening port

```
nmap -sTUV -p0-65535 YOUR-SERVER
```

# Auto-updates policy

Need to evaluate the risk of downtime

- ▶ Debian/Ubuntu restarts the services after upgrade
- ▶ but it doesn't for some third-party repositories e.g. [nginx.org](http://nginx.org)
- ▶ RHEL/CentOS does not
- ▶ care about listening daemons mostly
- ▶ kernel patch - what part is truly in use? (downtime)

# Auto-updates on GNU/Linux

*update systems → licensing lecture*

## Ubuntu

```
apt install unattended-upgrades  
dpkg-reconfigure -plow unattended-upgrades
```

## Slackware choice 1:

LAB // PoC autoslack for 14.2 vs current<sup>1</sup> – is it too dangerous to auto-update current and why?

## Slackware choice 2: DIY

```
vi /etc/cron.daily/DAILY  
  
# don't do that on current  
/usr/sbin/slackpkg update  
/usr/sbin/slackpkg -batch=on -default_answer=y upgrade-all
```

---

<sup>1</sup><http://www.slackware.com/~david/zuul/autoslack/>



# Auto-updates on BSD systems

Possibly scriptable

- ▶ FreeBSD: ?
- ▶ DragonFlyBSD: ?
- ▶ NetBSD: grab from nightly builds and erase everything but `/etc/`

goes as

```
tar xzpf base.tgz -C /
```

Possibly automated

- ▶ OpenBSD: syspatch utility
- ▶ MirBSD: *idem?*

# Network security in a nutshell

Split activities into VLANs

- ▶ e.g. DMZ, VoIP, user, mgmt/backup
- ▶ cluster/storage network not routed (but pivot possible)
- ▶ eventually ACLs for mgmt

Know your location - what network segment?

- ▶ got public IP?
- ▶ –or– NAT outbound traffic allowed?
- ▶ how many enemies you have?

Isolate insecure industrial tools and software e.g. SCADA

# Userland rootkit checkers

*some good practice I wouldn't recommend*

Regularly check against rootkits

- ▶ makes me think of grand-ma who absolutely needs an anti-virus
- ▶ it most probably won't detect anything targeted...

LAB // evaluate those detectors against DIY modifications...

*mainly GNU/Linux*

- ▶ Lynis
- ▶ Chkrootkit
- ▶ Rkhunter
- ▶ ClamAV
- ▶ LMD

–or– simply overwrite the binaries (BSD & Slackware)

*Almost done for this chapter*

*What were the three most important things to take care of on a server, security-wise?...*

==>

- ▶ open ports vs. network segments vs. firewall
- ▶ **KEEP YOUR SERVERS AND NETWORK DEVICES  
UP-TO-DATE !**
- ▶ weak passwords = no passwords

*// Questions on security basics?*

# MITM Explained

*just in case you didn't get it yet*

Two ways to explain things


- ▶ academic way
- ▶ military way



Alice → Trudy → Bob

Eve

Mallory



## PKIX

*What is the purpose of an SSL certificate?...*


*not just a key pair*

==> bind pubkey & domain name **and signed by** (intermediate) **authority**



Looks like there's only one root...

PKI



Works many times... **and at the same time**

*Which of those three can sign others?...*

==> only root CA and intermediates. you just have a leaf-node certificate.



## SSL/TLS certificate types

- ▶ Signed by official CAs (embedded Mozilla & Chrome)
- ▶ Signed by a private CA (pushed to workstations or added once)
- ▶ Self-signed (just like a root cert)

Ubuntu ships self-signed for convenience (what about Debian?)

```
/etc/nginx/snippets/snakeoil.conf  
/etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem  
/etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
```

*// Questions on PKIX?*

# Applied Cryptography

## Categories for crypto

- ▶ Symmetric ciphers
- ▶ Public Key ciphers
- ▶ Hash algorithms & PRNG
- ▶ Key negotiation algorithms

*Name a few **symmetric** ciphers (block vs stream)...*

## 64-bit symmetric block ciphers

DES, 3DES

IDEA

Blowfish (Bruce Schneier)

## 128-bit symmetric block ciphers

AES (Rijndael, NIST)


Camellia (Japan)

Twofish (Bruce Schneier)

SEED (South Korea)

ARIA (based on AES, South Korea)

GOST (w/o the H, Russia)



LAB // run  $\Gamma$ OCT encryption between e.g. LibreSSL and GNUTLS

## Symmetric stream ciphers

FISH (not seen)

RC4 (deprecated)

CHACHA20

A5/1



*Name a few public key ciphers (or signature schemes)...*

## Public key (asymmetric) ciphers

RSA encryption

ElGamal encryption // LAB

## Signature schemes

RSA signature

DSA

ECDSA

ElGamal signature // LAB

Schnorr signature // LAB

## Typical use-case (SSL)

- ▶ RSA/ECDSA to authenticate
- ▶ negotiates a secret and goes symmetric
- ▶ and eventually takes advantage of AES offloading

## Modes of operation (for block cipher)

ECB (there's a catch)

CBC (to-be deprecated)

CTR (make it a stream)

GCM (idem)

*What do you do for the last block, if there is not enough data to fit-in?*

# Padding

For the last block and with non-streaming modes

zero-padding (the catch is not that obvious)

PKCS#1 v1.5

PKCS#1 v2.0 + RSAES-OAEP

PKCS#1 v2.1 + RSAES-PSS

*What about hash functions, any names in mind?...*

## Hash functions

MD5 (not really deprecated)

SHA-1 (only deprecated for SSL certs)

SHA-2 (SHA-256, ...)

SHA-3 (NIST 2015) -- sponge construction

## Note

PKCS#1 v2.2 + SHA 224/256/512

*Something about Integrity?...*



Loads of acronyms...

- ▶ MAC Medium Access Control address (OSI layer 2)
- ▶ MAC **Message Authentication Code** (more than just a hash)
- ▶ MAC Mandatory Access Control (vs. DAC/RBAC)

- ▶ aka protected checksum & error detection code
- ▶ aka keyed hash: also message authentication based on symmetric secret
- ▶ (sign & verify but using the same secret)
- ▶ can be considered as a one-time pad when used for a single message

**HMAC** — two rounds with inner and outer derived keys

HMAC-MD5 SHA-1 SHA-2 SHA-3

**Faster MAC with universal hashing**

UMAC x32 optimized

VMAC x64+ optimized

SipHash (Daniel J. Bernstein)

Poly1305 (Daniel J. Bernstein)

**MAC based on mode of operation**

(CBC?) OMAC CCM GCM PMAC

# The special case of AEAD

happy-happy combinations e.g.

AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM

AEAD\_AES\_128\_CCM

AEAD\_AES\_SIV\_CMAC\_256

AEAD\_AES\_128\_OCB\_TAGLEN64

AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305

AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SIV

- ▶ MAC on both associated data and ciphertext
- ▶ MAC depends on context in neighbor messages/blocks

# PRNG

- ▶ “pseudo”
- ▶ cryptographically secure pseudorandom generators (CSPRGs)
- ▶ pseudorandom generator theorem  $\rightarrow$  one-way function

implementations

- ▶ stream ciphers (RC4, CHACHA20)
- ▶ block cipher with CTR or OFB modes

related to

- ▶ trapdoor operation
- ▶ hash functions (for the seed only?)

```
/dev/random -- requires initialized entropy
              -- previously required enough entropy
              (and /dev/arandom behaved like what it now does)
/dev/urandom -- unlimited (non-blocking)
```

```
cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
```

```
cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
```



*Are there ways to get a better entropy?...*

## Hardware

HWRNG & rng-tools

Radio-based (using noise)

## User-space software

HAVEGE (HARdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion)

timer\_entropyd

randomsound

*Name a few key agreement algorithms...*

## Key exchange algorithms

DH

DHE (PFS / ephemeral)

ECDH

ECDHE (PFS / ephemeral)

Note it's also possible to simply encrypt the secret and send it to Alice

# CIA triad / quadrad / polyad

- ▶ Confidentiality
- ▶ Integrity
- ▶ Availability
- ▶ (Non-repudiation)
- ▶ Authenticity (Authentication)
- ▶ (Accountability)

*Apply secure channels & crypto to those concepts*

*...which one leverages a secret (symmetric cipher)?*

*...which one leverages public key cryptography?*

*...and which one protects against MITM?*

==>

- ▶ Confidentiality -> symmetric encryption & key agreement (DH)
- ▶ Integrity -> hash function (possibly using privkey)
- ▶ Availability
- ▶ (Non-repudiation)
- ▶ Authentication -> public key crypto
  - ▶ -> auth with private key / sign
  - ▶ -> and also used for key agreement (RSA)
- ▶ (Accountability)

*How to authenticate / is any public key or certificate fine?...*



$\Rightarrow$  you need a Trust Anchor

*Is it a BI-DIRECTIONAL process?...*

==> you need to authenticate both sides if server is not public

## **Client authenticates server**

public HTTPS -- SSL -- PKIX chain of trust

## **Stub-client or forwarder authenticates answer**

DNS -- DNSSEC chain of trust

## **Bi-directional**

SSH -- client does TOFU fingerprint & PIN host pubkey

SSH -- server checks authorized pubkeys

Wifi -- PSK (when there is)

## **BTS authenticates handset**

GSM 2G -- SIM card

*// Questions on practical cryptography?*

# Tips & Tricks

- ▶ initiate an SSL session & read an X.509 certificate
- ▶ remote sniffing

Initiate an SSL session (becomes telnet)

```
openssl s_client -connect archlinux.org:443
```

Q

**Read an X.509 certificate**

```
openssl x509 -in domain.crt -noout -text
```



*Can we do both at once?...*

==>

```
echo Q | openssl s_client -connect archlinux.org:443 \  
    | openssl x509 -noout -text
```

## Super-duper remote sniffing

```
ssh -l root GOT_MIRROR \  
"/usr/sbin/tcpdump -n -e -i eth3 -s0 -w - " \  
| wireshark -k -i -
```

-e also show MAC addresses

-s0 backward compatible w/ now default packet snapshot  
length of 262144 bytes

- ▶ The interface is plugged to a dedicated port-mirror here
- ▶ ...otherwise need to filter out ssh itself)

*This is the end*